Intellectual Power: Hegemonic Discourse, Part 7

Hamid Rayhan

For Promit Hossein, Fiction writer, Successful Translator & Journalist

The bureaucratic and corporatist discourses are not difficult to understand that shape the administration of the university and, through it, teaching and research, as representatives of the master of discourse, in Lacanian terms and to the extent of these disciplines.

The sciences taught at the university are based on systematic unity and certainty and are designed to serve the interests of the community and society, representing the discourse of the university that defends hegemonic powers. The specific intellectual, in so far as he questions and subverts the hegemonic discourses within the system, corresponds to the speech of the hysteric, but if Lacan is right, this activity requires the mediation of the discourse of the analyst, which provides an interpretative indication of the desire that drives hysterical intellectual questioning, which also reminds individuals around societies that the temporary or intermittent appropriation of signifying masters is inevitable if the climatic terrain is to change, however, gradually, marginally, in a temporarily desirable but revisable direction, which denotes the preceding analysis, mainly through powerful explanatory ideas of Foucault, because, besides the understanding, a certain causality is implied, and partly by the modulation of those. In the theory of Lacan’s four discourses, is there a reason for the academics that practices and, as intellectuals, pacific, hope that their strategic activity in the Foucaldian sense does not lead to a situation in which their intellectual-academic work will be published as long as the intellectual work is directly translatable into emancipatory action, not only on the part of the people who work in the academy but also the people: the masses, the proletariat, the crowd, as Hardt and Negri have described. We are not afraid because freedom is something that is never lived, that is, if only momentarily, in what Lacan calls the revolutionary option, liberty or death; it is because, if Foucault and other post-structuralists are right and they are right, we never get out of compensatory power relationships in society, which means that we are inevitably entangled in overlapping discourse networks, and several layers that work in an ambivalent way to allow and simultaneously control, direct, diffuse and domesticate human action and behavior.

Nowhere are those who have mapped these multiple functions of discourse in a more condensed, evocative and programmatic way than in the discourse on language, and shows that, of agree with what individuals are trying to unravel with regard to the conception of the relations between will to knowledge, discourse and power: in the best of cases, the struggle for freedom, which always presupposes the quasi-transcendent human condition of being free and not free, spoken by speech and able to challenge it. The discourse is articulated within a network of strategic relationships and tactical movements, made possible by mechanisms governed by a series of different but overlapping principles with a twofold function, namely to enable discourses to function productively, but at the same time to control them, in a similar way to Lacan’s distinction between me and I, or ‘ego’ and the ‘I’, where the first serves as a place of limitation and stability for the spoken subject, while the second marks the position of no objective from which the subject speaks. A skeletal reconstruction of the order of speeches would be seen as follows and would allow corporatization and bureaucratization discourses to be situated in the grid thus outlined, as they were at the levels of master and university discourses within the framework provided by Lacan four speeches that suggest that there are several principles to control what would otherwise be a formidable proliferation, in the form of heavy materiality, discourse in society. These principles are classified into three main titles, which are in turn subdivided into several groups comprising three titles in the first and second titles and four in the last. The three main headings and their subdivisions are as follows: principles or rules of exclusion, including prohibition, division between reason and reason or madness and opposition between will and falsehood; rules or principles of internal control for classification, order and distribution, including comments, author and disciplines; and, finally, the rules relating to conditions of employment or the application of speech, including rituals, speaking communities, doctrine and social appropriation of speech, for example education, which makes the explanation of intellectual programme. of these principles, which operate in every society in a very complex way- its paradigmatically post-structuralist articulation of discursive linguistic structures is convincing in order to give a stable or extremely complex network or grid, insofar as they invariably produce power, to understand social and political relations, and at the same time intimate. At the diachronic level, these structures are constantly changing in specificity. In this way he reconciles stability and change, being and becoming.

This denies commentators who have insisted that post-structuralist thinkers such as Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, and Deleuze are beyond pallor when it comes to rationality, denouncing that their work is simply irrational. In fact, his work is an intertwined or multifaceted or complex analysis, exploring and developing aspects of human life and subjectivity that seem paradoxical or amphoric and, therefore, based on a differentiated conception of rationality. For example, prohibition has always worked in all societies, but in a way that shows its own cultural evolution and specificity. Similarly, and here, the paradoxical nature of how these principles work is clearly evident, the comment works in relation to what is considered in each culture or in different cultural domains such as literature, science, philosophy, and culture. religion as basic texts, but on the premiss that no comment, for example, the Talmud on a text such as the Torah, can say anything new, strictly speaking, in the sense that He does not appear in the basic text. But if this were the case, no comment would be necessary, yet such comments flourish in relation to the basic texts. Moreover, although this distinction between comments and fundamental texts remains intact at all times, what was previously considered as a comment sometimes modifies the position of a fundamental text which, in turn, generates comments; Derrida’s commentary on the origin of Husserl’s geometry in Derrida (1978), which is an early articulation of deconstruction, would be a representative example. For the present purposes, the most particularly relevant part of subsequent corporate orders of speech is one of the principles set forth in the rules governing the terms of use of speech, namely social appropriations of speech, of which intellectuals of the word the society specifically names education and it is important that has been developed on this subject. The power to even use concepts such as ideology and awareness to increase disciplinary power in its microphysical and metaphysical forms precedes the legitimization of powerization.

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